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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. PEE-TRIAL
A. Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, acting in its orig-
inal jurisdiction,' considered the jurisdiction of the Richland
County Court in New South Life Ins. Co. v. Lindsay.2 The
appellant in this matter, a holder of an endowment policy of
New South Life Insurance Company, after being permitted
to intervene in the lower court, moved to dismiss the action
for lack of jurisdiction. While the motion was under ad-
visement and the lower court hearing was continuing, an
application was made to the supreme court for a writ o!
prohibition which was also based upon the lack of jurisdiction
of the Richland County Court.
The original action was brought in the Richland County
Court after a substantial deficit was discovered in the re-
serves of the company. Subsequent to this discovery the com-
pany made a complete report of the same to the Insurance
Commissioner who then held a hearing and rendered a deci-
sion. The company then commenced the action in the county
court asking for injunctive relief and an order under Section
37-297 of the Code 3 directing rehabilitation of the company
in accordance with a plan "tentatively approved in principle
by the Chief Insurance Commissioner.
' 4
In defining the conditions for the granting of a writ of
prohibition the supreme court quoted the case of Ex parte
Jones :5
The ancient prerogative writ of prohibition has been recognized
and employed in the common-law system of jurisprudence for more
than seven centuries, and like all prerogative writs should be used
with forebearance and caution, and only in cases of necessity.
With regard to the function and scope of the writ, it has been
settled in this state from an early period that it will only lie to prevent
1. Under S.C. CODE ANN. §15-21 (1962) and S.C. CoxsT. art. V.
2. 258 S.C. 198, 187 S.E.2d 794 (1972).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. §37-297 (1962).
4. 258 S.C. at 203, 187 S.E.2d at 797.
5. 160 S.C. 63, 158 S.E. 134 (1931).
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an encroachment, excess, usurpation, or improper assumption of juris-
diction on the part of an inferior court or tribunal, or to prevent
some great outrage upon the settled principles of law and procedure;
but if the inferior court or tribunal has jurisdiction of the person and
subject matter of the controversy, the writ will not lie to correct
errors and irregularities in procedure, or to prevent an erroneous
decision or an enforcement of an erroneous judgment, or even in
cases of encroachment, usurpation, and abuse of judicial power or the
improper assumption of jurisdiction, where an adequate and appli-
cable remedy by appeal, certiorari, or other prescribed methods of
review are available.
6
The first ground cited by the insurance company to sup-
port county court jurisdiction was based on Sections 15-764
and 37-70 of the Code." To sustain jurisdiction under these
provisions the insurance company alleged it was appealing
an order of the insurance commissioner. The supreme court
found that the company was not seeking any review of any
decision made by the insurance commissioner, in that there
was no allegation that the insurance company was aggrieved
thereby or that there was any error therein. The second al-
leged basis for jurisdiction was founded on Section 15-764
of the Code,8 which provides that the county court has juris-
diction
S.. (1) When the amount demanded in the complaint or the value
of the property involved does not exceed fifteen thousand dollars;
(2) when there is no money demand; and (3) when the right involved
cannot be monetarily measured.9
Supposedly, this section was applicable because "the cause is
a civil case or special proceeding in which there is no money
demand and that the cause is one in which the right involved
cannot be monetarily measured."' 0 The fact that the deficit
involved was eight million dollars made it apparent to the
supreme court that the value of the property involved ex-
ceeded the statutory limit for county court jurisdiction and
that the right involved could be monetarily measured. Further
the court considered the fact that the insurance company al-
leged it had a value of several million dollars which would be
6. 258 S.C. at 199-200, 187 S.E.2d at 796. Berry v. Lindsay, 256 S.C. 282,
182 S.E.2d 78 (1971).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. §§15-764, 37-70 (1962).
8. Id., §15-764.
9. S.C. CoDE ANN. §15-764 (1962).
10. 258 S.C. at 201, 187 S.E.2d at 797.
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lost if the plan was not approved, and used this factor to sup-
port its denial of jurisdiction.
The third ground alleged for jurisdiction was based on
Sections 15-766 and 15-767 of the Code,1 which provide that
all general laws and statutory provisions, including circuit
court rules of practice and procedure, are applicable to the
county courts. The insurance company alleged that Section
87-297.1,12 which allows circuit courts to hear proceedings
for the purpose of rehabilitating insurance companies, was
a general law and therefore fell within the scope of Section
15-766 and 767. The supreme court summarily rejected this
contention by simply stating, "This statutory provision does
not purport to confer jurisdiction upon the Richland County
Court. . . ."13 Consequently, there being no grounds for juris-
diction of the Richland County Court, the writ of prohibition
was granted.
B. Parties
In Palmetto Production Credit Ass'n. v. Willson, 4 a case
involving mortgaged property, the mortgagee sought fore-
closure against the partnership mortgagor. When one partner
filed an individual counterclaim, the plaintiff demurred to
such. The supreme court, following a long line of South Caro-
lina decisions, reversed the lower court's decision to overrule
the demurrer and held that one partner cannot properly inter-
pose an individual counterclaim, a partnership and the indi-
viduals composing it being distinct legal entities.
II. TRIAL
A. Legal and Equitable Issues
Reaffirming its holding in Airfare, Inc. v. Greenville
Airport Comm'n,15 the court in State v. Yelsen Land Co.,
1 6
11. S.C. CODE ANN. §§15-766, 767 (1962).
12. Id., §37-297.1.
13. 258 S.C. at 205, 187 S.E.2d at 798.
14. 257 S.C. 13, 183 S.E.2d 565 (1971).
15. 249 S.C. 265, 153 S.E2d 846 (1967). Under our code practice legal
and equitable issues and rights may be asserted in the same complaint, and
legal and equitable remedies and relief afforded in the same action. In such
event the legal issues are for determination by the jury, and the equitable
issues for the judge sitting as a chancellor.
16. 257 S.C. 401, 185 S.E2d 897 (1972).
[Vol. 24
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held, notwithstanding the unfortunate wording of the state's
complaint which requested injunctive relief, that the nature
of the issues and the remedies sought are determinative of
the character of an action. In this case the state claimed title
to certain lands and sought both to have its title confirmed
and enjoin the defendants from trespassing thereon. In its
answer and counterclaim the defendants claimed title to the
property, alleged trespass and sought confirmation of their
title, monetary damages, attorney's fees, and injunctive re-
lief. When the case came up for trial, the lower court judge,
acting on his own motion and over the objection of the state,
referred all issues to the Master in Equity. From this ruling
the State appealed. The defendant, however, argued that the
issues were properly referred to the Master and the plaintiff
had waived its right to a jury trial because both the com-
plaint and counterclaim alleged no adequate remedy at law.
The supreme court disagreed, pointing to the fact that both
parties sought relief at law as well as in equity, confirmation
of title and injunctive relief, respectively, citing Bryan v.
Freeman17 in support of the requirement that a party be
granted a jury trial whenever it had raised the issue of title
to the property in question. "To hold that the State volun-
tarily relinquished its right to a jury trial of the law issues
involved would require a strained construction of the allega-
tion in the complaint."'18
B. Jury Trial
Citing the interest of orderly procedure, the supreme
court, in Gilford v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank," affirmed a
decision denying a motion for a new trial, basing such denial
on appellant's failure to raise an objection in a proper man-
ner. This case involved an action which was brought by a
survivor to obtain joint-survivor account funds that were
being withheld by the defendant bank. With consent of the
bank the issues were referred to the Master in Equity "to
take testimony and report his findings and recommendations
of fact and conclusions of law. ' 20 Subsequently the bank an-
swered, saying it was a disinterested stakeholder and alleged
17. 253 S.C. 50, 168 S.E.2d 793 (1969) (action to quiet title not referred
to Master).
18. 257 S.C. at 405, 185 S.E2d at 899.
19. 257 S.C. 374, 186 S.E.2d 258 (1972).
20. Id., at 377, 186 S.E2d at 259.
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that appellants should be made parties to the action. The
court ordered such, but a copy of the order referring the
issues to the Master was not served by the appellants. Coun-
sel for respondent, however, notified appellants of the joinder
by letter. Appellants' counsel thereafter sent a letter to re-
spondent's counsel objecting to having the matter referred,
and later at the hearing before the Master moved for a jury
trial. The Master, after satisfying himself that no motion
to have the Order of Reference set aside had been made and
that such Order had not been revoked, overruled the motion
for a jury trial. No further objections being made to the
mode of trial, the hearing proceeded. After the Master's re-
port was filed in favor of the respondent, the appellants
moved for a new trial "on the ground that the matter was
improperly referred and a hearing held by the Master over
objection of respondent, and on the ground that the matter
is one at law for trial by jury.121 The supreme court, ac-
knowledging the fact that a Master has no authority to grant
a jury trial, held the Master's overruling of appellants' mo-
tion for a jury trial was correct. In considering the alleged
error of trying the issues before the Master instead of .a
jury, the court reaffirmed its holding in Beall v. Weston
2 2
that adding of additional parties after a consent order of
reference did not revoke the order of reference in an equity
case. Furthermore, the court held that while the appellants
might have attempted to establish their right to a jury trial
by motion before the lower court judge, any such right was
waived when counsel failed to make such motion.
C. Motions
In Harlan v. Satterfield Constr. Co.,23 a verdict in the
lower court was rendered for the plaintiff and counsel for
defendant moved for judgment non obstante veredicto or, al-
ternatively, for a new trial. Thereafter, over counsel for
plaintiff's vigorous objection, the court allowed defense
counsel to postpone stating and arguing his grounds for the
motion until a transcript of the trial record was available.
When no grounds for the motion were given two weeks after
21. Other exceptions to the result of the Master's report were taken, but
are not discussed here.
22. 83 S.C. 491, 65 S.E. 823 (1909).
23. 257 S.C. 69, 184 S.E.2d 339 (1971).
[Vol. 24
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the trial, and after the court had risen, plaintiff's counsel
served notice of a motion to dismiss defendant's motions on
the grounds that the court no longer had jurisdiction to hear
them. After the transcript was prepared both plaintiff's and
defendants' motions were heard and overruled.
The supreme court acting on appeals by both parties
cited both Circuit Court Rule 7924 and Section 10-1461 of the
Code25 as requiring a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdit to be made before adjournment of the trial court.
"Such motions when heard at the trial term may be decided
afterward . . . and under our settled practice, with the con-
sent . . . of the opposing party, the trial judge may retain
jurisdiction beyond the term. .... ",26 The court noted that
opposing counsel must consent or make no objection to such
a retention of jurisdiction and that clearly in this case coun-
sel for plaintiff had not consented and in fact insisted on hav-
ing the grounds for the motion made known. Furthermore,
although plaintiff's counsel did participate in the discussion
as to preparing of the transcript, he did so under objection.
Therefore, defendant's motions died with adjournment.
The discretion of the trial judge in not granting a mo-
tion by the appellant for a voluntary nonsuit was challenged
in Harmon v. Harmon.27 The plaintiff, the second wife of the
defendant, filed for a divorce under Section 20-101 (1) of the
Code 28 alleging the defendant was committing adultery with
his first wife who was subequently allowed to join as a party
to the action. Alleging their marital difficulties were re-
solved, the plaintiff moved for a voluntary nonsuit under
Circuit Court Rule 45.29 The first wife, however, objected
to this since her divorce was Mexican and she had raised the
question of its validity prior to the nonsuit motion. Conse-
quently, the lower court denied the nonsuit, holding that the
status of the parties should be judicially determined. The
supreme court, noting that the recent adoption of Circuit
Court Rule 4530 has given the presiding judge greater dis-
24. RULES OF PRACTICE FOR THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF S.C. 79 (1971).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. §10-1461 (1962).
26. 257 S.C. at 73, 184 S.E2d at 340.
27. 257 S.C. 154, 184 S.E2d 553 (1971).
28. S.C. CODE ANN. §20-101(1) (1962).
29. RULES OF PRACTICE FOR THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF S.C. 45 (1971).
30. Id., (adopted May 13, 1969).
1972]
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cretionary powers in relation to the rights of plaintiffs to
dismiss or discontinue actions, affirmed the lower court de-
cision, holding that in light of the grounds for allowing the
first wife to join "[ilt would work a hardship and be unduly
prejudicial to the respondent to permit the discontinuance of
this action over her objection."
3'
D. Miscellaneous
In Hill v. American Express Co.,3 2 an action brought in
the lower court against a company issuing a credit card, for
wrongfully dishonoring the card, was declared by the court
to be one ex contractu, rather than one for defamation, there-
by avoiding the two year statute of limitations governing
defamation actions.
In Dickcard v. Merritt,33 the supreme court reaffirmed two
elementary principles. The first was that "the evidence to-
gether with all the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom,
has to be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.
'3 4
Secondly, the court held that a trial judge's charge must be
viewed as a whole and the separate portions thereof must be
considered in relation to the rest of the charge.
III. APPEAL AND ERROR
A. Interlocutory Judgments
In the past year, the supreme court heard two cases on
the issue of the right to appeal from an interlocutory judg-
ment. In the first, Geiger v. Carolina Pool Equipment Distrib.,
Ic., 35 the court cited two general authorities36 to support
its decision that an order denying a motion for summary
judgment, being an interlocutory decision, is not directly
appealable.
... [t]he prevailing view seems to be that the denial of a motion
for summary judgment is an interlocutory decision only and therefore
not directly appealable, since such a denial is not an adjudication on
the merits against the movant and he is not thereby foreclosed from
31. 257 S.C. at 161, 184 S.E.2d at 557.
32. 257 S.C. 86, 184 S.E.2d 115 (1971).
33. 256 S.C. 458, 182 S.E.2d 886 (1971).
34. Id. at 460, 182 S.E.2d at 888.
35. 257 S.C. 112, 184 S.E.2d 446 (1971).
36. 4 Am. JuR. 2d Appeal and Error §104 (1962) ; 15 A.L.R.3d 809 (1967).
[Vol. 24
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the possibility of prevailing in the case when the facts are devel-
oped .... 37
In the second case, Nauful v. Milligan,3" the defendant
appealed from an order granting a motion for summary judg-
ment on the issue of liability in an action for assault and
battery. The plaintiff argued that such an order was inter-
locutory and therefore not appealable until final judgment.
The supreme court acknowledged the fact that Rule 44 of
the Circuit Court Rules provides in subsection (c) that "a
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be ren-
dered on the issue of liability alone although there is a gen-
uine issue as to the amount of damages." 39 Citing the section
of the Code providing for appeals from interlocutory judg-
ments,40 the court stated that to be appealable an interlocu-
tory or intermediate order must be one "involving the merits."
Since the summary judgment in this case established that
all defenses alleged by the defendant were without merit,
therefore leaving only the question of damages at issue, the
court held that such an interlocutory decree involved the
merits and was appealable under Section 15-123 of the Code. 41
Turning to the substance of the appeal,42 the court did
reverse the lower court decision in part because the trial
court, after entering summary judgment, had proceeded to
determine what testimony would be admissible at a trial on
the issue of damages. The supreme court found this to be
error and held the lower court exceeded its authority.
B. Objections
Allen-Parker Co. v. Lollis43 involved an action in claim
and delivery brought by the assignee of a conditional sales
contract, wherein several procedural issues were raised which
the supreme court had little trouble disposing of based on
established law. The court first held that any exceptions made
37. 4 Am. Jura. 2d Appeal and Error §104 (1962).
38. 258 S.C. 139, 187 S.E.2d 511 (1972).
39. RULES OF PRACTIcE FOR THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF S.C. 44 (1972).
40. S.C. CODE ANN. §15-123 (1962).
41. Id.
42. The court affirmed summary judgment as to liability because the de-
fendant admitted attacking the plaintiff and the issues of provocation and mutual
combat were considered, with the court reaffirming several decisions holding
mere words inadequate provocation.
43. 257 S.C. 266, 185 S.E.2d 739 (1971).
1972]
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before the trial court but not argued in the appellant's brief
are considered abandoned.4 4 It was also held that where more
than one reasonable inference may be drawn from the evi-
dence, the question of fraud is one of fact.
45
The appellant next contended that the trial judge was
in error in his charge to the jury, but the court pointed to
the fact that counsel for the appellant was offered "[tihe
opportunity to express any objections to the charge as made
or to request additional instructions, as required by Section
10-1210 of the Code."140 Since no objections were raised at
that time the court held that no objections to the instructions
were available on appeal.47
In answer to appellant's final exception, that the verdict
did not conform to the charges, 48 the court noted that no
exception was made before the jury was excused and held:
It is well established that where a verdict is objectionable as to
form, the party who desires to complain should call that fact to the
court's attention when the verdict is published. Otherwise the right
to do so is waived .... Any error in the form of the verdict was
waived by failure of the appellant to make proper objection before
the jury was discharged.
IV. FEDERAL COURTS
A. Jurisdiction
The power of a federal district court to require a non-
resident corporation to defend an action in the District Court
was considered in McGee v. Holan Div. of Ohio Brass Co.49
The District Court in denying jurisdiction, held that portion
of the long-arm statute found in the Uniform Commercial
Code dealing with extraterritorial jurisdiction in tort claims 0
44. Shea v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 228 S.C. 173, 89 S.E2d 221 (1955).
45. Cook v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186 S.C. 77, 194 S.E. 636 (1938).
46. 257 S.C. at 278, 185 S.E.2d at 745.
47. Richardson v. Register, 227 S.C. 81, 87 S.E.2d 40 (1955).
48. The verdict given in the court's charge read: "[w]e find for the de-
fendant on the counterclaim . . . so much money." The verdict rendered was:
"We find for the defendant, and should be given title to the trailer and attor-
ney's fees," [sic].
49, 337 F. Supp. 72 (D.S.C. 1972).
50, S.C. CoDE ANN. §10.2-803(c) (1966).
614 [Vol. 24
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to be unconstitutional. 51 The basis of the action under which
long-arm jurisdiction was asserted was a claim for personal
injuries suffered when the defendant's product malfunctioned.
The equipment itself was purchased by the plaintiff's em-
ployer in Georgia from the defendant. The product in ques-
tion was an aerial hydraulic bucket which fell to the ground
while the plaintiff was working as an employee of the pur-
chaser. The defendant corporation was not domesticated in
South Carolina nor had it qualified to do business here. Being
chartered in New Jersey, with its principal offices in Ohio,
the defendant did maintain an office in Charlotte, North
Carolina. A salesman for the company, according to the plain-
tiff's employer, operating out of Charlotte, had made approxi-
mately two visits per year to the employer's business in
Sumter. The nature of these visits was not mentioned in the
opinion, but the court did note that the purpose was not to
make sales. Purchases from the defendant were made through
an independent company "not shown to be owned by defen-
dant or a subsidiary of defendant." 52 Further, the court noted
that deliveries to Sumter were not made in defendant's trucks.
Service upon the defendant was declared by the court to
be in accordance with Rule 4 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure53 and therefore not at issue. The development of
51. The court based its holdings on S.C. CoNsT. art. III, Sec. 17 (1895)
which provides: "Every act or resolution having the force of law shall relate
to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." The "long-arm
statute" was combined with the "Uniform Commercial Code" and as the court
pointed out, no mention of the statute was made in the title to the South Caro-
lina version of the Uniform Commercial Code. Noted by the court was the fact
that the "Official Uniform Commercial Code" drafted by the American Law
Institute contained no such provision. In pointing out the unconstitutionality of
such inclusion the court stated,
This is the very evil that the framers of the South Carolina
Constitution were attempting to avoid by Section 17 of Article
III. While the people of South Carolina may have thought they
were getting the nationally recognized Uniform Commercial
Code, the legislature actually passed an enlarged version thereof
which included provisions for jurisdiction and service in personal
injury tort claims in no way related to commercial transactions
and with no warning in the title of their inclusion therein.
52. 337 F. Supp. at 74.
53. FED. R. Cirv. P. 4(e).
1972]
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current jurisdictional theories was discussed briefly,5 4 with
the court necessarily basing its holding on the International
Shoe case and quoting from that decision:
Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."55
Acknowledging the fact that the Supreme Court of South
Carolina has adopted the very broad contacts theory of juris-
diction,5 6 and stating that the decision as to whether or not
maintenance of an action does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice was a question of fact to
be decided by the court, it was held that insufficient contacts
were present to support jurisdiction. Concluding that to re-
quire the defendant to stand and defend this case in this
jurisdiction would offend the International Shoe standard,
57
the court failed to mention the inconvenience that would
result to the plaintiff by requiring him to bring suit in an-
other jurisdiction, or any interest the state might have in
seeing issues of this nature resolved in local forums.5 s
Although the court had decided that due process stan-
dards would be offended by extending jurisdiction, the court
went further and held that the subsection of South Carolina's
version of the Uniform Commercial Code dealing with tort
actions was unconstitutional.5 9 In so holding, the court noted
that two state trial judges had, in separate cases, reached the
same conclusion when faced with non-commercial cases.
6 0 It
54. The court mentioned the presence and consent theories. For an inter-
esting analysis of the developments in extraterritorial jurisdiction over both
non-resident corporations and individuals see, Note, Developments in the Law,
State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909 (1960).
55. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90
L.Ed. 95 (1945).
56. Cited in support of this were two cases. Carolina Boat and Plastics
Co. v. Glascoat Dist., Inc., 249 S.C. 49, 152 S.E.2d 352 (1967) and Boney v.
Trans-State Dredging Co., 237 S.C. 54, 115 S.E2d 508 (1960).
57. 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945).
58. See n. 54 supra.
59. See n. 51 supra.
60. deLoach v. Nash, (Court of Common Pleas, Richland County, March
27, 1971) (Judge Rhodes) and Byrd v. Melton (Court of Common Pleas,
Richland County, July 14, 1971) (Judge Nicholson).
[Vol. 24
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is interesting, however, to note that the court in its opinion
recognized that Article I Section 34 of the South Carolina
Constitution 6 ' does not require all subsections of Section 10.2-
80362 to be struck down, but only those with no reference to
commercial transactions. 63 Such a distinction, of course, would
appear to have permitted the plaintiff to contend that sub-
section (h) of Section 10.2-80364 was not only constitutional,
but specifically applicable to provide jurisdiction in a war-
ranty action brought against a manufacturer by an injured
South Carolina resident for injuries sustained in this state.65
This subsection reads:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who
acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the
person's . . . (h) production, manufacture, or distribution of goods
with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be used or con-
sumed in this State and are so used or consumed.66
Furthermore, with jurisdiction obtained under subsection (h)
based upon a breach of warranty, there appears to be nothing
which would bar the plaintiff from asserting other causes of
action, in tort, against the defendant.
In conclusion, it is submitted that this decision might not
reflect current trends in extending jurisdiction over non-
resident corporations. However, it must be acknowledged that
a good argument can be made for the contrary position.6 7
61. S.C. CONST. art. I, §34.
62. S.C. CODE ANN. §10.2-803 (1966).
63. Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Textured Fibres, Inc., 310 F. Supp.
491 (D.S.C. 1970) (Russell, D.J.).
64. S.C. CODE ANN. §10.2-803(h) (1966).
65. The contention might be made that Georgia law should apply in this
case, since the equipment was purchased in Georgia, and under GA. CODE ANN.
Sec. 109A-2-318 (1962) an employee would not be entitled to bring a warranty
action as the warranty would not extend to the purchaser's employees. But
the modem trend is to apply the law of the place of injury. See, Hardman v.
Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Ill. App2d 42, 198 N.E2d 681 (1964), and
Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960).
66. S.C. CODE ANN. §102-803(h) (1966).
67. Two other cases dealt with the extraterritorial jurisdiction of South
Carolina courts. Duplan, Inc. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 703
(D.S.C. 1971), was mentioned by the court in McGee as dealing entirely with
a commercial transaction and therefore not conflicting with constitutional
standards. In Duplan the district court held that jurisdiction in such cases
must be based on state law and such laws must not violate due process fairness
standards and subsequently required the defendant to defend. The Fourth Cir-
1972"[
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[Author's Note: Subsequent to the writing of this article,
the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina reen-
acted the applicable sections of the jurisdictional statute in
an attempt to cure the constitutional flaw. S.C. CODE ANN.
§§10.2-801 through 10.2-809 (Supp. Aug. 2, 1972).]
B. Service, Venue, Forum Non Conveniens
In Penntube Plastics Co. v. Fluorotex, Inc.68 a federal
district court ruled on three major issues dealing with patent
infringement cases in federal courts. The action was brought
by a Delaware corporation against a Delaware corporation
and its subsidiary which was allegedly a South Carolina cor-
poration. Subsequently a declaratory judgment action was
brought in the District of Delaware alleging invalidity of
the patent in question.
After denying a motion by the defendant Delaware corpo-
ration to quash service, the court considered the defendant's
motion to dismiss for improper venue. Since the Delaware
corporation was obviously not a resident of the District of
South Carolina, the District Court had to find under the
special venue statute, 9 that acts of infringement had been
committed in the state and that the defendant had a regular
and established place of business in the district. Since the
defendant admitted selling the products which allegedly in-
fringed on the plaintiff's right, the first prong of the test,
described by the court as specific and unambiguous, was
satisfied. Consequently, the defendant was deemed to have a
regular place of business in South Carolina, satifying the
second prong of the special venue test. The motion to dismiss
for improper venue was therefore overruled.
After granting a motion by the plaintiff to restrain the
Delaware corporation from proceeding further in its action
to invalidate the patent in question, the court considered the
defendants' motion for transfer of the action to the District
of Delaware. The plaintiff argued that a transfer was barred.
(A] transfer is authorized by the statute only if the plaintiff had an
'unqualified' right to bring the action in the transferee forum at the
cuit Court of Appeals in Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th
Cir. 1971), applied the two part test and found, notwithstanding state provisions
for jurisdiction, insufficient contacts present to support jurisdiction.
68. 336 F. Supp. 698 (D.S.C. 1971).
69. 28 U.S.C. §1400(b) (1948).
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time of commencement of the action; i.e., venue must have been proper
in the transferee district and the transferee court must have had power
to command jurisdiction over all of the defendants.70
Citing the special venue statute7l used to support service
on the defendant "parent" corporation, the court found the
defendant South Carolina corporation had a "regular and
established place of business" in Delaware and had "com-
mitted acts of infringement" there also. Finding that there
was a virtual lack of corporate separateness and that "Fluoro-
tex (the South Carolina defendant) does in fact have a reg-
ular and established place of business at Newark, Delaware
and has committed acts of alleged infringement there," 72 the
court held the statutory requirements had been satisfied. This
established the plaintiff's "unqualified right" to bring the
action in Delaware and thereby defeated his main objection
to the transfer. After establishing this fact, numerous con-
venience factors, most relating to witnesses and evidence,
were given in support of granting defendants' motion to
transfer.
WLLIAM A. POLLARD
70. 336 F. Supp. 698, 703 (D.S.C. 1971), citing Shutte v. Armco Steel
Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 24 (3rd Cir. 1970).
71. 28 U.S.C. 1400(b) (1948).
72. 336 F. Supp. at 704.
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